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360 Michigan Law Review 
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-
The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate 
Setting: A Suggested Approach 
[Vol. 69 
The extent to which the attorney-client evidentiary privilege ap-
plies to communications made by employees of a corporation to the 
corporation's attorney was recently reconsidered in the case of 
Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated v. Decker.1 This issue arose 
during the pretrial discovery proceedings for a major antitrust suit 
before the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois. A group of state and local governments, public schools, and 
public libraries sued book publishers and wholesalers for treble 
damages arising from alleged conspiracies that inflated the price of 
children's editions of library books.2 The plaintiffs deposed approxi-
mately one hundred witnesses, many of whom had testified before a 
federal grand jury that had taken part in prior criminal proceedings 
against the defendant publishers.3 Due to the passage of time and to 
the alleged recalcitrance of the deponents, the plaintiffs felt that the 
testimony produced in the depositions was both incomplete and mis-
leading.4 Consequently, they filed a motion pursuant to rule 34 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" seeking inspection of the 
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (see text accompanying notes 63-67 
supra). It could be argued that if the values asserted in the initial challenge to the 
zoning ordinances were sufficiently fundamental to satisfy the close-scrutiny equal 
protection test, they should also be entitled to protection against state-enforced re-
strictive covenants as was the case in Shelley. Although the Supreme Court has not 
extended Shelley beyond the precise factual situation involved in that case, it would 
seem shortsighted indeed to allow the goal sought in challenging the zoning law to 
be so easily circumvented. However, even if Shelley is not extended to lot-size re-
strictive covenants, the fact that such covenants could achieve the same result as the 
challenged zoning ordinance does not provide a sufficient reason for a refusal by a 
court to invalidate the offensive zoning laws. The state should not be allowed to 
discriminate even if private persons are allowed to. Moreover, there is no assurance 
that the restrictive covenants would result in every case, and therefore the invalidation 
of the zoning laws might still have a significant effect. 
I. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term; 
renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term). 
2. More than forty suits, originating in eight judicial districts, were consolidated, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), before Judge Bernard M. Decker 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for discovery 
and pretrial proceedings. Illinois v. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37 
(N.D. Ill. 1969), revd. in part sub nom. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 
F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term, renum-
bered No. 113, 1970 Term). 
3. In 1966 the United States had convened a criminal grand jury to investigate the 
alleged incidents. After the testimony of nearly ninety witnesses, the United States de-
cided not to seek any indictments. 50 F.R.D. at 39. 
4. 50 F.R.D. at 39. 
5. FED. R. Crv. P. 34 states: "Upon motion by any party showing good cause there-
for ••• and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court ••• may (1) order any 
party to produce and permit the inspection • • • of any designated documents • • •• " 
FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(b) allows various orders for the protection of the parties during 
discovery. 
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grand-jury transcripts containing the testimony of eleven of the 
witnesses and of certain "debriefing" statements that the defendants' 
attorneys had prepared by interviewing the witnesses after they had 
testified before the grand jury.6 The defendant publishers resisted 
the motion on the grounds that the documents were protected against 
such production by the personal attorney-client privilege,7 by the 
corporate attorney-client privilege, or by the "work product" doc-
trine.8 
District Judge Bernard Decker ruled that the requested grand-
jury transcripts should be released.9 He further held that the debrief-
ing statements, with one exception, were not protected by the 
personal attorney-client privilege because "the attorneys did not (1) 
render personal legal advice after the witnesses completed their 
grand-jury testimony, (2) advise them on other personal matters, 
or (3) bill the witnesses for their services."10 In addition, by uti-
lizing the "control group" test11 to determine the extent to which 
the corporate attorney-client privilege applied to the debriefing 
statements, he held that only two of the witnesses were members of 
the control group, and that therefore only the statements of those two 
witnesses were protected.12 As for the statements that were not pro-
tected by either the personal or corporate attorney-client privilege, 
he held that most of them were not the work product of an at-
torney, 13 and that those that were14 could not be protected against 
6. The statements consisted of summaries of the witnesses' testimony as prepared 
by the witnesses themselves or as recorded by the defendants' attorneys on the basis 
of interviews with the witnesses immediately after testifying. 50 F.R.D. at 42-44. 
7. In general, the attorney-client privilege prohibits the compelled disclosure of 
confidential communications between attorney and client. See text accompanying notes 
31-39 infra for Wigmore's statement of the general principle. 
8. The "work product" of an attorney includes "interviews, statements, memoranda, 
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal briefs, and countless other tangible 
and intangible" items. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). In Hickman, the 
Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules "adequate reasons" must be estab-
lished by the moving party in order to justify the production of such material by court 
order. 329 U.S. at 512. 
9. Judge Decker stated, "The disclosure of grand jury minutes is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge," and concluded that the facts presented in this 
case revealed "a compelling need for the disclosure of the requested minutes.'' 50 
F.R.D. at 39-40. 
IO. 50 F.R.D. at 43. 
11. Under the control group test, a communication to an attorney is privileged if 
made by an employee who has the authority to make or take a substantial part in a 
decision about any action that the corporation might take on the advice of an attorney. 
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 
1962). See also text accompanying notes 60-62, and pt. I. C. 3. infra. 
12. The court observed that "[w]hile other witnesses, such as sales executives and 
regional managers, might have shaped the pricing policies concerning library editions, 
they did not participate in the corporate problem about which legal advice was sought 
-the company's litigation response to the price fixing cases." 50 F.R.D. at 44. 
13. The court reached this conclusion by finding that "[t]he lawyers functioned 
primarily as investigators. By asking questions and recording the answers, they at• 
tempted to reconstruct the witnesses' grand-jury testimony. Such peripheral partici-
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production because the plaintiffs had proven the "good cause" and 
"special circumstances"15 that are necessary in order to require pro. 
duction of the work-product of an attorney under rule 34 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.16 
Because they failed in an attempt to have the matter certified for 
interlocutory appeal,17 the defendants petitioned the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the district court to vacate that portion of its production 
order that permitted the plaintiffs to inspect the debriefing memo-
randa. The writ was granted in part and denied in part.18 
The appellate court upheld the lower court's findings that the 
personal and corporate attorney-client privileges did not apply to the 
debriefing statements that were obtained from former employees and 
from employees of other corporations.19 It further held that the 
"good cause" required to be proven for production under rule 34 
had been sufficiently established.20 However, the court of appeals 
reversed the district court on the question whether the corporate 
attorney-client privilege applied to statements made by persons who 
were employees of the corporation at the time the statements were 
made. Although the appellate court conceded that Judge Decker had 
correctly applied the control group test,21 it ruled that the privilege 
pation by a lawyer does not convert a factual summary into his work product." 50 
F.R.D. at 44 (emphasis added). In support of this conclusion, the court quoted from 
Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44, 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), for the proposi-
tion that "[t]he rationale underlying ••• [Hickman v. Taylor] was intended to apply 
only when [an attorney] acts in his true professional capacity." 50 F.R.D. at 44. 
14. These statements included the "counsel's 'recollections, observations, comments 
and impressions about [the witness1 report of his appearance before the grand jury.' " 
50 F.R.D. at 44. 
15. For Judge Decker's lengthy enumeration of the factors that he felt established 
good cause, see 50 F.R.D. at 45. 
16. See note 5 supra. 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) allows a district judge in a civil action, when making 
an order that is otherwise not appealable, to certify in the order that such order in-
volves a controlling question of law "as to which there is substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the litigation." The court of appeals then has discretion 
to permit an appeal to be taken from the order. Judge Decker, however, followed the 
holding in Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964), and 
denied certification on the ground that interlocutory appeal under the circumstances 
presented would not facilitate the final disposition of the case. Brief for Petitioners at 
6, Decker v. Harper&: Row Publishers, Inc., 397 U.S. 1073 (1970). 
18. Harper&: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 
397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term). The 
writ was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964). 
19. The court stated that the attorney-client privileges had not been clearly enough 
established in this area to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 423 F.2d at 490. 
20. But the court did indicate that "(w]here an attorney personally prepares a 
memorandum of an interview of a witness with an eye toward litigation such memo-
randum qualifies as work product even though the lawyer functioned primarily as 
an investigator.'' 423 F.2d at 492. 
21. 423 F.2d at 491. 
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did apply to these statements. This holding was based on the court's 
feeling that the control group test was not wholly adequate because 
it failed to distinguish between employees who are not part of the 
control group, and who are therefore "virtually indistinguishable 
from bystander witnesses," and those employees who should properly 
be deemed corporate agents for purposes of the privilege.22 There-
fore, the production order was held to have been improperly issued 
to the extent that it relied solely on the control group test. The court 
then formulated its own test for determining which statements were 
protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege: 
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control 
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the 
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors 
in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the 
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the 
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties 
of his employment.2s 
Consequently, a writ of mandamus ordering the partial reversal of 
the production order was issued on the grounds that "maintenance 
of the attorney-client privilege up to its proper limits has substantial 
importance in the administration of justice, and [that] an appeal 
after disclosure of the privileged communication is an inadequate 
remedy ... .''24 
The plaintiffs responded to the issuance of the writ of mandamus 
by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court, which was subsequently granted.25 Certiorari was 
granted for consideration of both the question of the efficacy of using 
a writ of mandamus to reverse a trial court's discovery or¢1.er to pro-
duce documents and the question whether the court of appeals im-
properly held that the attorney-client privilege "extends to narrative 
statements solicited by corporate counsel from non-management 
employees about their grand-jury testimony."26 
The wide chasm between the position taken by the district court 
and that taken by the court of appeals appropriately illustrates the 
degree of confusion that currently exists concerning which individ-
uals within a corporation may function as the client for purposes of 
the attorney-client privilege. However, it is submitted that such con-
fusion is not necessary and can be eliminated. This Note will first 
review the development of the personal attorney-client privilege and 
22. 42!1 F.2d at 491. 
2!1. 42!1 F.2d at 491·92. 
24. 42!1 F.2d at 492. 
25. Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 
Term; renumbered No. 113, 1970 Term). 
26. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., !197 U.S. 
107!1 (1970). 
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the extent to which the term "client" has been expanded for use 
with that privilege. Then, the development of the corporate attorney-
client privilege will be examined with an eye toward isolating the 
tests that the courts have used to define the extent of the term "cli-
ent." Finally, with the results of these examinations in mind, an ap-
proach will be suggested that, if adopted by the courts, could effec-
tively eliminate the confusion that presently exists with regard to the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting. 
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
A. The Personal Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is considered to be the "oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications."27 It dates back to at 
least 1577, when the privilege was regarded as a point of honor-a 
consideration for the oath and honor of the attorney.28 However, the 
policy underlying the use of the privilege has changed. Today, the 
privilege embodies a policy that seeks to encourage freedom of con-
sultation with legal advisors by removing apprehension of compelled 
disclosure by the attorney of client communications.29 But because 
the nature of the information that is withheld in particular cases can 
never be pinpointed, it is difficult-if not impossible-to determine 
whether the privilege does in fact promote freedom of consultation 
and encourage full disclosure of material information to one's legal 
advisor. This speculative nature of the benefits of the privilege serves 
as the basis for the countervailing policy that, while the privilege 
should be allowed, it should "be strictly confined within the narrow-
est possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."39 The 
inherent conflict between these two countervailing policies does not 
appear in the usual case involving the application of the personal 
privilege. But when the attorney-client privilege is applied in a 
corporate setting, in which the client is an artificial entity operating 
through agents, the conflicting policies collide and frequently lead 
to judicial confusion. 
In the usual case involving the personal privilege the courts rely 
on and apply Wigmore's famous eight-element test: 31 
(I) Where legal advice of any kind is sought32 (2) from a professional 
27. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 229~, at 542 (3d ed. J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
28. Id. § 2290. 
29. Id. § 2291. This policy developed during the eighteenth century. Id. § 2290. 
30. Id. § 2291, at 554. As pointed out by an early Massachusetts court, "this rule 
of privilege, having a tendency to prevent the full disclosure of the truth, ought to be 
construed strictly." Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 97 (1831). 
31. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2292, at 554 (footnotes added). 
32. See id. §§ 2294-99. 
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legal advisor in his capacity as such,83 (3) the communications re-
lating to that purpose,84 (4) made in confidence35 (5) by the client,86 
(6) are at his instance permanently protected31 (7) from disclosure 
by himself or by the legal advisor,38 (8) except the protection be 
waived.39 
Of these elements, the fifth is of primary concern in defining the 
corporate privilege. In light of the first two elements, it is clear that 
the term "client" should include any person who seeks legal advice 
from a professional legal advisor. But over the years the courts have 
expanded this definition, and thereby held that a communication 
will be considered to be from the client when it is from or through 
an agent, employee, or interpreter;40 or when, if the client is incap-
able of communicating correct and sufficient information, it is a 
report by a specialist or expert employed by the client or by the 
attomey.41 More specifically, the privilege has been extended to pro-
tect a physician's report prepared to aid the attorney in preparation 
for litigation,42 reports by experts or special agents employed by the 
client,43 and a statement obtained by the client's insurance company 
33. See id. ~§ 2300-04. 
84. See id. §§ 2306-10. "Communication" includes, among other things, "documents 
delivered or shown to the attorney at a consultation •.•• " Id. § 2307, at 591. 
35. See id. §§ 2311-16. 
36. See id. §§ 2317-20. 
37. See id. §§ 2321-23. 
38. See id. §§ 2324-26. 
39. See id. §§ 2327-29. 
40. Id. § 2317. 
41. See, e.g., City &: County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 
P.2d 26 (1951), discussed in note 42 infra. See also note 43 infra. 
42. In C:ty &: County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 
26 (1951), the sole purpose of a medical examination was to aid the attorney in 
preparation for litigation. In writing the opinion, Justice Traynor relied heavily on 
§ 2317 of 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27 (3d ed. 1940). He concluded: 
Thus, when communication by a client to his attorney regarding his physical or 
mental condition requires the assistance of a physician to interpret the client's 
condition to the attorney, the client may submit to an examination by the physi-
cian without fear that the latter will be compelled to reveal the information dis• 
closed. 
37 Cal. 2d at 237, 231 P.2d at 31. This case was relied on by the Michigan supreme 
court when a similar situation arose in Michigan: 
Had [the plaintiff] possessed the requisite training and skill to make an accurate 
appraisal of her physical condition and to draw reasonable conclusions there• 
from ••• any communication by her to her attorney of such appraisal and diag-
nosis would without question have been privileged •••• To accomplish the desired 
result the attorney representing her deemed it necessary to employ a medical 
expert to act for him and his client and to convey to him on behalf of his client 
the information he needed ••.• 
Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 5-6, 116 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1962). 
. 43. A report was held to be privileged when it was prepared by a party sent by 
an insured, at the suggestion of his solicitors, to a foreign country for the express 
purpose of collecting evidence on behalf of the insured in support of his litigation. 
Steele v. Stewart, 41 Eng. Rep. 711 (Ch. 1844). 
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that was later transmitted to the attorney defending the client in a 
related criminal action.44 
Bearing in mind the conflicting policies underlying the attorney-
client privilege and the extent to which the term "client" has been 
expanded in the context of the individual privilege, the question of 
determining who may be regarded as representing the client in the 
corporate context may be examined. 
B. Historical Development of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
Prior to the decision by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois in Radiant Burners) Incorporated v. 
American Gas Association,45 it was widely assumed that the attorney-
client privilege applied to corporations as well as to individuals.46 
While the district court's decision in Radiant Burners, which held 
that the privilege did not apply to corporations,47 was reversed,48 it 
still gave rise to speculation and concern about the extent to which 
the privilege should apply to corporations. In its opinion reversing 
the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed itself to this speculation when it stated that the privilege "is 
worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless 
an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly 
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the 
logic of its principle."49 Thus, while it appears to be settled, at least 
44. After a discussion of both sides of the issue, the Illinois supreme court con• 
eluded that "[u]nder such circumstances we believe that the insured may properly 
assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant 
purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the 
insured." People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 461, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964). 
45. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), revd., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 929 (1963). 
46. See notes 47 &: 48 infra. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209 (1942) states: "As 
used in Rules 210 to 213 .•• 'client' means a person or corporation •••• " UNIFORM 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 26(3)(2) (1953) states that " 'client' means a person or corpora-
tion •... " 
47. The district judge stated that his research led him "to conclude that a corpora• 
tion's right to assert the privilege has somewhat generally been taken for granted by 
the judiciary •••. " 207 F. Supp. at 772. He then went on to hold that the privilege 
did not apply to corporations because (I) historically the privilege was "fundamentally 
personal in nature" and thus could "be claimed only by natural individuals and not 
by mere corporate entities" (207 F. Supp. at 773); and (2) the element of secrecy re• 
quired for the privilege would be impossible within the modem corporate structure 
(207 F. Supp. at 773-74). 
48. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The court of appeals stated that "based on history, principle, 
precedent and public policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available 
to corporations •••• " 320 F.2d at 323. In its opinion, the court listed cases that had 
recognized the privilege as applicable to corporations. 320 F.2d at 319 n.7. 
49. 320 F.2d at 323, quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2291, at 554. See note 30 
supra and accompanying text. 
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in the federal courts, that the privilege does apply to corporations,ro 
it is not clear which persons within a corporation can communicate 
with an attorney and be reasonably assured that the communication 
will be privileged. 
Before the decision in Radiant Burners, two approaches were 
used by the courts to resolve that issue: the privilege was either ex-
tended to communications by any employee of the corporation, or 
only to those made by selected agents of the corporation. The former, 
"broad" approach was applied by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. 
United Shoe Machinery Corporation.51 He held that when 
letters to or from independent lawyers were prepared to solicit or 
give an opinion on law or legal services, such parts of them are privi-
leged as contain, or have opinions based on, information furnished 
by an officer or employee of the [corporation] in confidence and 
without the presence of third persons.52 
A subsequent decision that adhered to this line of reasoning implied 
that the corporate client, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, 
included "employees, officers, directors."53 However, none of the 
courts that have adopted this approach appear to have explained in 
detail why such a broad range of protection should be granted to 
corporations. 154 
The second traditional approach, which applies the privilege only 
to communications from certain employees or agents, was developed 
in D. I. Chadbourne, Incorporated v. Superior Court.55 In that case 
an insurance corporation's attorneys had employed a firm to investi-
gate accidents and to transmit the reports to them. The California 
supreme court held that the reports would have been privileged if 
under all the circumstances of the case, he [the employee making the 
communication] is the natural person to be speaking for the corpora-
tion; that is to say, that the privilege will not attach in such case 
unless the communication constitutes information which emanates 
50. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE 
UNITED STATES, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND 
MAGISTRATES rule 5-03(a)(l) (Preliminary Draft March 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 126, 
249 (1969), which states that "[a) 'client' is ••. a corporation ..•• " 
51. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). 
52. 89 F. Supp. at 359 (em;,hasis added). 
53. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 
1954) (emphasis added). See also Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1962 Trade 
Cas. ,J 70,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 
251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court relied on United Shoe and Zenith; Phillips v. 
Delaware Power & Light Co., 194 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963). 
54. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE 
L.J. 953, 960 (1956). For a typical case that demonstrates this failure to discuss the 
rationale behind the broad approach, see Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 
F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
55. 60 Cal. 2d 723, !188 P.2d 700, !16 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964). 
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from the corporation (as distinct from the nonlitigant employee), 
and the communicating employee is such a person who would 
ordinarily be utilized for communication to the corporation's at-
torney.56 
The courts that applied this approach appear to have relied on the 
well-established rule that a client may communicate to his attorney 
through an agent, 57 or on the ground that the reports were created as 
a necessary means of making a confidential communication with the 
attorney. 58 
Thus, at the time Radiant Burners was decided some courts-
including most federal courts-were taking a broad approach by 
holding that a communication from any employee was privileged, 
and others were taking a more selective approach by holding that a 
communication was privileged only when the employee making the 
communication would be the "natural" or appropriate person to be 
speaking for the corporation. 
After Radiant Burners the courts continued to employ both of 
these tests. 59 However, a third approach was also developed. This 
theory, which was first enunciated by Judge Kirkpatrick in City of 
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,60 has become 
known as the "control group" test. Under this test a communication 
will be held to be privileged 
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he 
56. 60 Cal. 2d at 736-37, 388 P.2d at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (emphasis added). 
Other cases applying the natural-person approach include Sierra Vista Hosp. v. 
Superior Court, 248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967); People v. Glen Arms 
Estates, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1965); Ford Motor Co, 
v. O.W. Burke Co., 59 Misc. 2d 543, 299 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969). 
Apparently, none of the federal courts have explicitly adopted this approach. 
57. Wigmore says: "A communication, then, by any form of agency employed or 
set in motion by the client is within the privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, 
§ 2317, at 618. This principle was applied in the corporate setting in Schmitt 
v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942). The privileged statement in that 
case was taken by the claims agent "after consultation with and by direction of 
the company's attorneys and immediately turned ••• over to them for use in anticipa-
tion of litigation •••• " 211 Minn. at 550, 2 N.W.2d at 415. 
In some situations the courts have applied the privilege to agents without any 
discussion as to the rationale for this application. See, e.g., Fire Assn. of Philadelphia 
v. Flemming, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S.E. 420 (1887). 
58. In Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P .2d 1025 (1954), certain reports 
and photographs were prepared by agents of the defendant's employer and were given 
in confidence to the attorneys for the defendant and his employer for use in possible 
litigation. The California supreme court stated that "(i]t follows that where the com-
munication is between corporate employees and is embodied in reports • • • for the 
purpose of redelivery to a corporate attorney the privilege attaches if the reports • • • 
were created as a means of communicating confidential information • • • ." 42 Cal. 2d 
at 508, 267 P .2d at 1029. 
59. See notes 53 & 56 supra. 
60. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. 
v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). 
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may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part 
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon 
the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a 
body or group which has that authority, [because] then, in effect, 
he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure 
to the lawyer ••• ,e1 
Several courts have adopted this approach and have held that the 
control group is limited to upper-echelon management personnel.62 
As a result, the protection afforded by the privilege is restricted to 
communications made by or to a very small group of individuals 
within any given corporation. 
C. Evaluation of the Traditional Tests 
Thus, the spectrum of views that are presently voiced by the 
courts consists of a broad (any employee) approach, a selective 
(natural person) approach, and a narrow (control group) approach. 
Each of these approaches has its own strong and weak points. 
I. Broad Approach63 
Those who favor the broad approach argue that the diffuse struc-
ture of a corporation requires proportionally broad coverage in 
order to carry out the privilege's underlying purpose of assuring the 
client that his full and frank communications concerning legal mat-
ters will not be subject to compulsory disclosure.64 This argument is 
buttressed by a feeling on the part of the judges who adhere to this 
approach that the harm caused by a restriction of the attorney-client 
privilege would greatly outweigh any resulting positive effects. As 
stated by one federal district court judge, "I am, frankly, hesitant to 
do anything which would contribute to the undermining of the pro-
tection afforded by the time-honored rule which excludes from evi-
61. 210 F. Supp. at 485. 
62. In Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Cal. 1963), a 
district court held that the control group included only directors, officers, department 
heads, division managers and their first assistants, and division chief engineers. In 
Hogan v. Zietz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315 (N.D. Okla. 1967), modified on other grounds sub 
nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968), division managers and their assistants 
were considered to be members of the control group. In Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. 
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), corporate vice presidents and a division 
vice president and general manager were considered to be part of the corporation's 
control group. See also Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 5 TRADE REc. 
REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) ,r 73,122 (M.D. Pa. March 27, 1970); Goliminas v. Fred Teitel-
baum Constr. Co., 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251 N.E.2d 314 (1969); Day v. Illinois Power 
Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964). 
63. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See, e.g., Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1962 Trade Cas. ,r 70,192, 
at 75,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 
F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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dence such confidential communications."65 Further, this approach's 
ease of application creates a measure of predictability on which at-
torneys and corporations can rely. Thus, the broad approach encour-
ages the disclosure of all relevant information and thereby fosters the 
underlying purpose of the privilege. 
However, because of the approach's broad coverage, it is suscepti-
ble of abuse and tends to create a wide "zone of silence"66 around 
corporate affairs. For example, because a communication to an attor-
ney from any employee will be privileged, a corporation could funnel 
masses of information through its attorney and thus bring communi-
cations that would not normally be privileged under the umbrella of 
protection. As one author has stated, "[w]here corporations are in-
volved, with their large numbers of agents, masses of documents, and 
frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few 
judges ... would long tolerate any common-law privilege that al-
lowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them 
with legal advisers."67 
It is also argued that the approach is in direct conflict with the 
dictum of the case of Hickman v. Taylor,68 which involved memo-
randa prepared by a corporation's attorney that summarized his 
interviews with some of the corporation's employees. The Supreme 
Court held that although the memoranda were part of the attorney's 
"work product," they were not covered by the attorney-client privi-
lege. In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that "the pro-
tective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which 
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in 
anticipation· of litigation."69 Since the witnesses in Hickman were 
employees of the corporation, it is clear that the Supreme Court did 
not regard the privilege as extending to communications from all 
corporate employees. One district court that has followed the Hick-
man line of reasoning has suggested that when an employee gives in-
formation to his corporate employer's attorney, the key question in 
determining whether the privilege applies is "was he at the time, in 
contemplation of law, the corporation seeking advice?"70 I£ the ques-
tion may be answered affirmatively, the communication should be 
privileged. But when an employee gives information in order that 
someone other than himself can receive advice, the employee is 
65. A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
66. The phrase "zone of silence" was apparently coined by David Simon in 1956. 
Simon, supra note 54, at 955. 
67. Id. at 955-56. 
68. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
69. 329 U.S. at 508. 
10:·city of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 
(E.D. Pa.) mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). 
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merely a witness. Therefore, a holding that his communication is 
privileged-as would be the conclusion under the broad approach-
would violate the spirit and intent of Hickman.71 
In response to this argument it can be asserted that the Court in 
Hickman made no effort to define the situations in which an em-
ployee will be considered a witness rather than the corporate client. 
It merely held that in the particular fact situation before it, the 
communications were made by witness-employees. Hence, it might be 
argued that the broad approach presents no necessary conflict with 
Hickman. But because the broad approach protects communications 
to attorneys made by all employees, including those who are merely 
witnesses, it frequently violates the Hickman dictum. 
In summary, then, it can be said that courts that have utilized the 
broad approach have failed to examine each of the two policies that 
underlie the attorney-client privilege: by concerning itself solely 
with the promotion of the freedom of attorney consultation, the 
broad approach overlooks the need to prevent corporations from 
abusing the privilege. Thus, it is submitted that the broad approach's 
appeal as an easy-to-apply formula is greatly outweighed by its dan-
gerous tendency to stimulate the formation of unnecessarily broad 
zones of silence. 
2. Selective Approach72 
Those who favor the selective approach argue that it extends the 
privilege to corporations only to the degree necessary in order to 
foster the basic purposes of the privilege. This approach is based on 
the premise that "[a] corporation is entitled to the same treatment 
as any other 'client'-no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice 
from an attorney, and in that relationship confidentially communi-
cates information relating to the advice sought, it [should be pro-
tected] from disclosure .... " 73 But this approach also recognizes that 
"reason dictates that the corporation not be given greater privileges 
than are enjoyed by a natural person merely because it must utilize 
a [natural] person in order to speak."74 Proponents of the selective 
approach feel that it fosters the policies underlying the attorney-
client privilege because it recognizes that many people within a 
corporation may function as the corporate client, yet restricts the 
71. 210 F. Supp. at 485. 
72. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text. 
73. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See also D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 
2d 723, 736, 388 P .2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964), in which the California 
supreme court stated: "Certainly the public policy behind the attorney-client privilege 
requires that an artificial person be given equal opportunity with a natural person to 
communicate with its attorney • • • ." 
74. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 
36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964). 
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privilege's coverage to only those persons who are identified with 
the interests of the corporation. These proponents, therefore, urge 
that the selective approach reduces the likelihood that a zone of 
silence will be created around a corporation. 
However, this approach has the decided disadvantage of failing to 
produce predictable results. This lack of predictability stems from 
the fact that the courts that have used the test have made no attempt 
to define what attributes an employee must possess in order to be 
considered the natural person to be speaking for the corporation. 
These courts have subjectively viewed situations after communica-
tions have been made, and have then retrospectively determined 
whether the privilege should apply. In so doing, they have failed to 
provide objective guides for determining future conduct. As a result, 
an attorney and his client have little to rely on when attempting to 
predict whether a particular communication will be privileged. 
Therefore, a client may feel inhibited about what he can tell his 
attorney, thereby impairing the effectiveness of his attorney's repre-
sentation. 
Thus, although the selective approach represents an effort by the 
courts to mold what was originally an individual privilege into a 
privilege that fits the structure of the modern corporation, its use-
fulness is severely limited by its failure to provide objective guide-
lines that an attorney can use to aid his initial appraisal of which 
employees will or will not be covered. Because of this uncertainty, 
the selective or natural-person approach provides an undesirable 
standard for determining the scope of the corporate attorney-client 
privilege. 
3. Narrow Approach15 
The narrow or control group approach appears to be based on 
the premise expressed in Radiant Burners that the privilege is "fun-
damentally personal,"76 coupled with the general policy that the 
attorney-client privilege should not be unduly extended.77 Under 
this approach, the control group of a corporation-normally con-
sisting of its board of directors and chief officers18-is regarded as 
that group of people in the corporation that is most analogous to an 
individual client, because it is the responsibility of the officers and 
directors "to fear for the well-being of the corporation just as an 
individual fears for his own well-being."79 Thus, the narrow ap-
75. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. 
76. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. m. 
1962) reud., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See note 47 supra. 
77. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 
1963), and note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
78. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. 
79. Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the 
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 235, 241 (1961). The 
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proach limits the extent of the privilege to communications by those 
who control, take a substantial part in,80 or influence a corporate 
decision. 81 It is this tight restriction on the class of individuals who 
can make privileged communications and the resulting prevention of 
zones of silence that comprise the greatest advantages of the narrow 
or control group approach. 
However, it has been argued that this approach is too artificial 
and too narrow, because "[t]oo often middle management executives 
who probably do not qualify for inclusion in the control group .•. 
have responsibilities for making recommendations which are ratified 
verbatim by the higher echelon management which [would] be a 
part of the so-called 'control.' "82 In fact, middle management may 
include the parties whose statements most need protection because 
these men frequently are the real decision makers. Another disad-
vantage of this approach is that it has failed to produce any objective 
guides that can be used to predict who the courts will consider to be 
members of the control group. The problems caused by this lack of 
objective standards are best illustrated by Congoleum Industries, In-
corporated v. GAF Corporation.83 In that case, a corporation had 
appointed a special group to investigate possible patent litigation and 
to furnish information to the attorney to be used as a basis for cor-
porate decisions. The court concluded that the vice president for 
operation and a division vice president and general manager were 
the only members of the investigative group who were properly 
members of the control group. Three other officers were found not 
to be members of the control group on the ground that within the 
special group they "held advisory as opposed to decision-making 
positions."84 Thus, the subjective nature of the control group test 
concept that the board of directors is responsible for the management and affairs of 
a corporation is contained in the corporation statutes of most states. See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1963). 
The authority of officers and other corporate agents is usually derived from the 
articles of incorporation, bylaws, or resolutions of the board of directors. W. CARY, 
CASES AND M!.TERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 150-53, 190-91 (4th ed. 1969). Since the officers 
and directors are directly responsible to the owners of the corporation-the share-
holders-for the corporation's day-to-day well-being, they are as analogous as possible 
to the individual client for purposes of determining which persons fear for the well-
being of the corporate client. 
80. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 
(E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), and text accompanying note 60 supra. 
81. Illinois v. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37, 43 (N.D. Ill. 1969) 
revd. in part sub nom. Harper &: Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970) (No. 1337, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 113, 
1970 Term). 
82. Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 
352, 375 (1967). 
83. 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
84. 49 F.R.D. at 85. 
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prevented the corporation from successfully structuring its investi-
gation procedure to comply with the control group test and thereby 
fully to avail itself of the privilege. As a result of decisions such as 
that reached in Congoleum, corporations may hestitate fully to dis-
close to their attorney information pertinent to litigation. 
Further, the courts that have utilized this approach appear to have 
overlooked the fact that the individuals in a corporation can be 
divided into two functional groups for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege: decision makers and givers of information. In the 
context of the personal attorney-client privilege, the individual client 
acts in both capacities-he gives information and then, based on the 
attorney's advice, he makes a decision-and any communication 
either to or from his attorney is privileged. The control group ap-
proach concentrates on only those employees in the corporation who 
are decision makers and completely ignores the fact that information 
must be given to the attorney before he can render legal advice. To 
that extent, then, the narrow approach provides an incomplete 
analogy to the individual privilege. 
Thus, by concentrating on only one aspect of the total problem, 
the control group approach fails to deal with all of the considerations 
that underlie the privilege. As a result, the approach is not only un-
workable for purposes of legal analysis, but may also be destructive 
of the client's confidence in his attorney. 
4. Balancing Approach 
Because of the difficulties encountered by the broad, selective, 
and narrow approaches, one commentator has suggested a case-by-
case balancing approach.85 In essence this approach asks "whether the 
good that the privilege seeks to accomplish-candor between client 
and attorney-would be defeated unless the particular agent were 
permitted to speak for the corporation."86 If the "good" would be 
defeated, then this approach would privilege the communication. In 
theory, this inquiry would promote full disclosure by corporate 
clients to their attorneys, yet would not protect communications that 
were not relevant to the promotion of such disclosure. 
But while the balancing approach would do away with some of 
the difficulties associated with the other approaches, it would be un-
workably unpredictable and hence incompatible with the purpose of 
the privilege-promoting full disclosure to attorneys. Its unpre-
dictability is a result of the fact that it incorporates a subjective de-
termination of what is privileged without providing objective guide-
lines. Thus, the balancing approach fails to correct the defect that 
hampers the selective and narrow approaches-uncertainty. 
85. Simon, supra note 54. See also Recent Case, 23 VAND. L. REv. 847, 854 (1970). 
86. Simon, supra note 54, at 956. 
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II. SUGGESTED APPROACH 
A. Basic Precepts of a Sound Approach 
The difficulties associated with all of these approaches suggest 
that a viable corporate attorney-client privilege should satisfy at least 
the following three precepts. 
First, the corporate privilege should be as analogous as possible 
to the privilege afforded individuals. Clearly, the fact that a corpora-
tion must utilize many persons to speak for it is not a valid reason 
for granting it a greater privilege than that granted an individual. 
For example, assume that a secretary, while looking out her office 
window, saw one of her corporate employer's trucks collide with an 
automobile driven by a private individual. A statement by that secre-
tary to the private individual's attorney-or to the truck driver's 
attorney-would not be privileged since she clearly was neither the 
client nor a representative of the client. Consistency and fairness 
would indicate that the corporation also should not be able to assert 
the privilege in this situation. Moreover, since the privilege developed 
as an individual privilege and since most judicial precedents in this 
area relate to individuals, a corporate privilege analogous to the in-
dividual privilege would enable the courts to work within an estab-
lished and familiar framework. The courts would thus be in a posi-
tion to insure that the corporations would not receive greater benefit 
from the privilege than would individuals. 
A second precept should require the corporate privilege to be 
structured so that it will foster the accomplishment of the purposes 
underlying the privilege without unduly restraining the use of the 
privilege by making it unpredictable and difficult to utilize. A vague 
or unworkable standard is undesirable from both the attorney's and 
the court's points of view. From the lawyer's viewpoint, the under-
lying policy of assuring a client that his communications will remain 
confidential will be served only if the lawyer is able to predict, with 
reasonable reliability, that a particular communication will be held 
by a court to be privileged. A court, on the other hand, needs a work-
able approach in order to curb a corporation's attempt to establish 
an overly broad zone of silence. Without clear guidelines, corpora-
tions might be tempted to create improperly broad zones of silence 
in the hope that the courts would be unable or unwilling, because 
of the difficulty in applying uncertain rules, to police the privilege 
effectively. 
In order to avoid any conflict with the holdings of the Supreme 
Court, a third precept should require that a viable approach be 
consistent with the dictum of Hickman v. Taylor.87 The Court in 
87. 829 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra. 
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Hickman stated that the privilege does not cover communications 
from employees who are merely witnesses. Therefore, a suggested 
approach should, as far as possible, draw a distinction between com-
munications by witnesses who are also employees and communica-
tions by employees who are considered to be corporate clients. 
Since each of the previously discussed approaches satisfies some 
of these requirements,88 it would seem that a viable approach could 
be constructed by combining the more desirable elements of each. 
B. The Elements of the Suggested Approach 
It is proposed that in determining whether the attorney-client 
privilege exists in a particular case, the courts should ascertain 
whether: (1) legal advice was being sought, (2) the advice was being 
sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) 
the communication was related to the situation about which the 
advice was sought, (4) the communication was made in a manner 
such that it can be said that it was intended to be confidential, and 
(5) the employee making the communication is within the definition 
of "corporate client." 
These elements are essentially the first five of the eight elements 
delineated in Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 89 Because steps two and three concern the status of the attorney 
and the nature of the communication, they are independent of the 
nature of the client. Hence, the determination under those two 
elements will be the same whether the client is an individual or a 
corporation, and the rules and precedents established by the courts 
for these elements in connection with the personal attorney-client 
privilege can be applied unaltered to the corporate privilege. It is 
only in conjunction with the other three steps that a slightly different 
analysis is called for in order better to adapt the privilege to the 
structure of the corporation. 
I. Was Legal Advice Being Sought? 
The court must first determine whether the corppration was 
seeking legal advice as that term has been defined for application to 
the personal attorney-client privilege.90 In order to answer this 
question, it is submitted that the court should ascertain whether 
someone with the proper authority to commit the corporation to take 
88. The selective, narrow, and balancing approaches all attempt to .make the cor-
porate privilege parallel to that afforded individuals, and also to exclude employees 
who are more than witnesses from the privilege's coverage. However, the broad ap• 
proach, which grants the privilege to communications by any corporate employees, 
provides for more certainty. See the discussion of these approaches in pt. I. C. supra. 
89. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2292, at 554. See text accompanying notes l!2·86 
supra. 
90. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, §§ 2294-99. 
December 1970] Notes 377 
legal action has taken the initial step of seeking legal advice. As was 
previously pointed out, 91 an individual consulting an attorney per-
forms two functions: he seeks advice upon which to make a decision, 
and he provides information to the attorney so that the advice can 
be given. At this point in the corporate-privilege inquiry the court 
should be concerned only with examining those people in the cor-
poration whose functions are analogous to the decision-making func-
tion in the individual dichotomy.92 Thus, if someone in the corpo-
ration who is authorized to make a decision about legal action has 
determined that the corporation should seek legal advice and the 
corporation has acted on that determination, then this first step has 
been satisfied. The precedents created in the determination of who 
comprises the control group would be useful to courts in determin-
ing whether an authorized person has committed the corporation to 
some form of legal action. As used in this particular context, the 
control group would be limited to those persons who have actual 
corporate authority to commit the corporation to legal action; thus 
step one would involve primarily a factual determination. 
2. Was the Communication in Confidence? 
Once a court has concluded that the corporation has sought legal 
advice from an attorney and has made or received a communication 
pertinent to such advice, it should consider whether the communica-
tion to the attorney was made in confidence. The basic difficulty 
encountered with this determination stems from the fact that a 
corporation functions only through its agents. In order to under-
stand this difficulty, one must delineate the two situations in which 
it can arise. The first situation can best be described by illustration. 
Assume that a factual report of an incident giving rise to litigation 
involving C corporation is prepared by E, an employee of the cor-
poration. Assume further that this report would be privileged if 
transferred directly from E to the corporation's attorney. However, 
C's policy and the necessity of insuring that E has made a full and 
accurate disclosure require that the information be approved by S, 
E's supervisor, before its submission to the attorney. At this point, 
because the information was communicated to a third person before 
reaching the attorney, the issue arises whether it was intended to be 
confidential. 
It may be recalled that when an individual client is incapable of 
communicating complete information, communications by his agents 
or experts that fill in the gaps are privileged.93 That situation is 
similar to the problem confronted by corporate clients when a full 
91. See discussion in pt. I. C. 3. supra. 
92. See text following note 84 supra. 
98. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. 
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and accurate disclosure to an attorney requires a combination of the 
talents of two or more employees working under one or more super-
visors. Thus, in order to foster the policy of encouraging full and 
accurate disclosure by clients and to maintain the analogy to the 
individual-client situation, communications within the corporation 
that are necessary for completeness and accuracy of information given 
the attorney should be considered confidential even though they 
have been communicated to third persons. However, holding them 
confidential, without any restrictions, would facilitate the creation 
of zones of silence. This danger would be substantially eliminated if 
the class of persons to whom the communication can be disclosed 
without losing the protection of the privilege was limited to those 
persons who, because of the structure of the corporation, must know 
of the communication in order to insure that the attorney is obtain-
ing both full and accurate information. Thus, it is submitted that 
such a communication should be considered confidential if all the 
employees with knowledge of it obtained that knowledge as a direct 
result of having performed their assigned jobs, and if the pertinent 
information was associated directly with their work. 
The difficulty ·with ascertaining whether a communication by a 
corporate employee is confidential can also arise in a second situ-
ation. An attorney may obtain confidential information that he must 
pass on to the corporation's executives so that they will have all of 
the facts necessary for making a decision. In order to make an in-
formed decision, these decision makers must have not only the ad-
vice of the attorney but also knowledge of the facts upon which that 
advice is based.94 Thus, in order properly to perform his function, 
the attorney must be able to reveal fully to decision makers the sub-
stance of what he has learned from corporate employees and the 
ramifications thereof without fearing that he would thereby remove 
the privilege from information that would otherwise be protected.915 
Therefore, it would be appropriate and consistent with the under-
lying policies of the privilege to hold that information that is com-
municated in confidence by a corporate employee-an information 
giver-to an attorney remains confidential when that information is 
subsequently related by the attorney to the corporation's decision-
makers in order to advise them fully concerning possible litigation. 
In conclusion, then, it can be seen that in order for the corporate 
privilege to be analogous to the individual privilege, information 
must be regarded as confidential when it is communicated by in-
formation givers to the attorney and when the attorney passes the 
94. Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 547 (1968). 
95. Wigmore states, "[t]hat the attorney's communications to the client are also 
within the privilege was always assumed in the earlier cases and has seldom been 
brought into question." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2320. 
December 1970] Notes 379 
communication on to the decision makers. The danger of permitting 
the creation of zones of silence can be ameliorated by restricting the 
group of individuals who may communicate privileged informa-
tion-that is, by restricting the group of persons who may be re-
garded as the corporate client. 
3. Was the Employee a Corporate Client? 
If a particular communication survives the barriers erected by 
the first four steps of the suggested analysis, a court must then deter-
mine whether the employee or employees making the communica-
tion fit within the definition of "corporate client." Here the natural-
person concept as formulated in the selective approach96 provides a 
viable analytic base. 
Since the individual client functions in the capacity of both in-
formation giver and decision maker, a corporate attorney-client priv-
ilege that is analogous to that afforded an individual should cover 
communications from both the corporation's decision makers and 
its information givers. But the corporate privilege should also 
reflect the countervailing policy of preventing corporations from 
placing unnecessarily large amounts of material in the privileged 
category. It is submitted that both of these policies can be effectuated 
if only employees who are the natural or appropriate persons to be 
speaking or listening for the corporation are considered to be the 
corporate client, and if the term "natural person" is clearly and con-
cisely defined. Under the proposed approach an employee would 
qualify as such a natural person if (1) he is the highest-ranking in-
dividual within the corporate structure to have access to the informa-
tion, and he either (a) obtained the information as a direct result of 
performing the job assigned to him by his employer and such in-
formation is associated directly with his work, or (b) obtained 
knowledge of the information because the communication was 
passed to him-as a supervisor of another corporate client-for 
approval of changes in the normal company flow for that type of 
communication within the corporation; or (2) he obtained the in-
formation from the attorney as a member of the corporation's con-
trol group. 
C. Evaluation of the Suggested Approach 
If followed, the suggested approach should eliminate the difficul-
ties associated with the other approaches because it meets the three 
prerequisites of a viable approach. First, it is analogous to the privi-
lege afforded individuals. Clearly, the individual privilege has been 
extended to cover communications that are from or through agents 
or interpreters, or that constitute reports of specialists or experts 
employed by the client or by the attorney when the client is incap-
96. See pt. I. C. 2. supra. 
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able of communicating correct and sufficient information to the at-
torney.97 It is equally clear that communications by the attorney to 
the client or his agent are privileged.98 These principles are con-
sistent with the fact that an individual client, acting for himself or 
through agents, both provides information to his attorney and makes 
decisions based on that advice. By defining the "corporate client" as 
that person in the corporation who can either provide correct and 
sufficient information to the attorney or obtain the information from 
the attorney so that a decision can be made, the suggested definition 
of "client" is analogous to that presently used in the individual 
situation. 
Second, the proposed approach fosters the privilege without un-
duly restricting it. Because this approach would provide a court 
with a set of objective standards for determining whether an em-
ployee functions as a corporate client, an attorney should be able to 
predict with a reasonable degree of certainty whether a contemplated 
communication would be privileged. The unpredictability that 
would remain would be little more than that which presently faces 
an attorney with an individual client, since the suggested approach 
would be analogous to the personal privilege. The increased pre-
dictability would thus promote the major purpose of the privilege-
fostering the freedom to seek legal advice-by removing fears that 
the attorney might subsequently be compelled to disclose the com-
munication. 
Moreover, the proposed approach would not encourage the cre-
ation of zones of silence by corporations. In applying this approach a 
court would look at any given situation and determine whether 
someone in the control group was seeking legal advice, whether the 
communication was made in confidence, and whether it was made by 
an individual who functioned as a corporate client. Any attempt by 
a corporation to funnel all of its records through an attorney, and 
thus create a zone of silence around its entire operation, would be 
discovered by the courts at one or more of the steps in the analysis. 
For example, funneling everyday business records-such as sales con-
tracts, interoffice memoranda, letters to and from persons outside the 
corporation, or minutes of meetings-to an attorney would not auto-
matically make those records privileged. In most cases a member of 
the control group would not have actively sought legal advice about 
matters involved in a particular business record. Further, when legal 
advice is sought, the privilege would apply only to those documents 
that were related to the subject on which the advice was sought. 
Finally, the records that could successfully clear the first two hurdles 
would probably not have been made and treated in a confidential 
manner. 
97. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See note 95 supra. 
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Finally, the approach satisfies the third precept necessary for an 
effective corporate attorney-client privilege since it avoids any con-
flict with the dictum of Hickman v. Taylor.99 The information that 
an employee obtains as a mere witness to an event will not be privi-
leged because he did not obtain the information while acting as a 
supervisor of the employees who did prepare the information, or 
because-when such information was associated directly with his 
work-he did not obtain the information as a direct result of per-
forming the job assigned to him. This latter situation can best be 
explained through illustration. A communication from a truck 
driver employed by a corporation who negligently hits someone 
would be covered by the privilege because the information would be 
a direct result of the performance of his job and would be associated 
directly with the nature of his work. On the other hand, a dock hand 
who witnessed the accident could not make a privileged communica-
tion. Although the information may have been a direct result of the 
performance of his job-being at his place of duty at the time he 
witnessed the accident-the information was not associated directly 
with his work-the loading of trucks. Thus, under both the Hickman 
dictum and the suggested approach, any communication by the dock 
hand to the corporation's attorney would not be protected. 
In addition to satisfying the three precepts that are essential to 
an effective corporate privilege, the suggested approach provides a 
relatively simple analysis. Under the traditional approaches the 
courts have attempted to apply a definition of the term "client," 
which developed primarily from precedents involving individuals, 
to an artificial entity. The suggested approach, however, would en-
able a court to solve problems by applying familiar principles that 
are not concerned with the nature of the client. Then, when the 
court reaches the conceptually difficult area-if it does at all100-it 
will have already collected sufficient information about the corpora-
tion, the communication, the employee who made the communica-
tion, and the attorney to be able to determine whether the definition 
of "corporate client" covers the employee. By thus separating and 
narrowing the factual issues, the ultimate inquiry will become less 
difficult. 
D. A Hypothetical Case 
The over-all application of this suggested approach is best under-
stood by examining a hypothetical case, the facts of which are similar 
to those presented in Harper & Row.101 Assume that BQF Corpo-
99. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra. 
100. In most situations the communication probably will be determined to be un-
privileged either because legal advice was not being sought or because the com-
munication was not made in confidence. 
101. See text accompan)ing notes 2-7 supra. The facts reported by the district 
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ration is being investigated by a federal grand jury for alleged price-
fixing activities, and that the grand jury has subpoenaed several 
employees of the corporation to testify before it. Because of their 
concern about possible future litigation involving the alleged activi-
ties, BQF's board of directors has authorized the corporation's presi-
dent to consult an attorney. 
The attorney informs the president that in order to advise the 
corporation properly on what action to take to avoid or to defend 
against any future litigation, he must, among other things, learn as 
much as possible about what BQF's employees have told the grand 
jury. Because of the secrecy of the proceedings, it is decided that this 
can best be accomplished by the attorney debriefing each employee 
after he testifies. Each employee is accordingly debriefed, and after 
each debriefing the attorney writes a short memorandum concerning 
the substance of the witness' testimony. A private plaintiff subse-
quently sues BQF in federal court for damages resulting from the 
alleged price-fixing activities, and moves the court to order BQF to 
produce the debriefing memoranda. The issue therefore arises 
whether these memoranda are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
The hypothetical has been set up so that the :first four steps of 
the approach have been satisfied: legal advice was sought by a mem-
ber of the control group, the advice was sought from a professional 
legal advisor, the communications were clearly related to the poten-
tial litigation about which advice was being sought, and the com-
munication was made with an intent that it be confidential-no one 
was present at the time of the debriefing other than the attorney 
and the specific employee involved, and the attorney revealed the 
communications only to members of the corporation's control group. 
Whether or not each communication will be privileged will there-
fore depend on whether each employee was a corporate client with 
reference to the particular information that he gave to the attorney. 
Employee A, who is a district sales manager for the corporation, 
related the details of a meeting that he attended at which the cor-
poration's various district sales managers discussed the prices that 
BQF would charge during the coming year. Under the suggested 
approach, A's communication will be privileged only if, at the time 
he attended the meeting, part of his job was to attend such meetings. 
If so, the information was obtained as a direct result of his perform-
ing his job as a sales manager, and the information is associated 
court and by the court of appeals in Harper &- Row are very similar to the facts of 
this hypothetical case. Because the courts did not apply the suggested approach, they 
did not collect all of the information necessary for its application. Therefore, certain 
facts have been assumed in the hypothetical case so that the proposed approach 
could be applied to a situation that reflects the problems presented in Harper &- Row. 
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directly with an aspect of his work-that of being informed of the 
corporation's pricing policies so that he can set the prices for his 
district. 
Employee B, another district sales manager, not only talked about 
the same meeting, but he also told the attorney about a cocktail 
party he had attended with the sales managers of the corporation's 
closest competitors. He testified that at this party, general pricing 
information was exchanged and price brackets for each corporation 
were informally established. After applying the suggested test, it 
becomes clear that only a portion of the communication about the 
cocktail party will be covered by the attorney-client privilege. As-
suming that the information was obtained as a direct result of B 
performing his job as a sales manager, some of the information may 
nevertheless not be associated directly with that job. As a sales 
manager his job may include establishing the prices for his own dis-
trict, learning from the corporation what prices he must charge, and 
generally overseeing the sales activities in his area. However, his job 
is directly associated only with his corporation's prices and his own 
district, and not with overhearing conversations in which the cor-
poration's competitors discuss their prices. In regard to the conversa-
tions in which BQF's competitors discussed their prices, B is merely 
a witness. While attendance at such a party may be part of his job, 
listening to competitors discuss their prices is probably not associated 
directly with his duties as a sales manager. This determination would 
ultimately rest on how broadly the courts would allow any given 
employee's job to be defined. If the courts would allow the job 
definition to include the performance of illegal activities-including 
price-fixing-then a corporation could, in part, expand the scope of 
the privilege and defeat attempts to limit it reasonably. However, 
a discussion of the policies that should be applied to and the limits 
that should be placed on the definition of an employee's job is be-
yond the scope of this N ote.102 
III. CONCLUSION 
At the present time, courts are uncertain which persons within a 
corporation may be considered as the client for purposes of applying 
102. The decisions and articles dealing with the vicarious liability of employers for 
the acts of employees may be useful in attempting to determine the scope of an 
employee's job for purposes of the suggested approach. See A. CoNARD &: R. KNAUSS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE I.Aw OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 91-134 (3d ed. 1965); 
F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE I.Aw OF AGENCY §§ 364-411 (4th ed. 1952); w. SEAVEY, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 83-89 (1964); REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§§ 228-l:7 (1958); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 115-26 (1916); 
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Coum. L. REv. 444 (1923). It also might be helpful 
to examine the concepts that have developed in determining the extent of the fiduciary 
responsibility of an agent to account for gains to his principal. See A. CONARD & 
R. KNAuss, supra, at 497-528. 
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the attorney-client privilege. All of the tests that are presently being 
used by the courts and that have previously been proposed have 
some significant shortcoming. Either they leave the attorney-client 
privilege open to abuse by allowing the creation of broad zones of 
silence around corporations, or they leave the attorney in a per-
plexed state, so that he cannot confidently predict which communi-
cations will be privileged. The former problem leads to an imper-
missible degree of corporate secrecy that gives the corporation a 
major advantage over its individual adversary and that unduly 
interferes with the truth-finding process. The latter problem dis-
courages corporations from fully disclosing pertinent information to 
attorneys, and consequently prevents the attorneys from adequately 
representing their clients. 
The proposed approach should substantially solve these prob-
lems. The system is conceptually easy to apply; therefore, an attorney 
should be able to predict with reasonable certainty what informa-
tion will be protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege. 
This certainty should encourage corporations to disclose fully im-
portant information to their attorneys. Further, because the sug-
gested approach restricts the scope of the corporate privilege and is 
easy for courts to apply, it will enable the courts to control attempts 
by corporations to build broad zones of silence around their cor-
porate affairs. 
